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Abstract 
Silk production in West Bengal maintains a low 
profile despite its high profitability. The 
usual tools of analysis while emphasise relative 
prices and 'information' as the key factors in 
the reallocation of resources overlook the 
conditions of reproduction in underdeveloped 
markets. Land gives highest yield in India 
and that too under rainfed condition, the knowledge 
of the cultivation, at least, in its traditional 
form is widely known, the linked activities are 
also developed with respect to skill, yet the 
forces of growth are often reflexed. This study 
tries to argue that the phenomenon is reflective 
of the underdeveloped nature of capitalism in 
agriculture, in general. 
Silk production in West Benga_ : ja 
case of stunted commercialization 
I. The Problem 
Data show that the profitability in sericulture is much higher 
compared to any generally practised crop - production in West 
Bengal (see Section II). This wide margin between the cost of 
production and the price (Table 1) has been prevailing for 
quite a long period. The 'supply and demand' theories suggest 
that the relatively high rate of profit in this sphere of 
production is only a temporary phenomenon. As all the factors 
of production fetch the same effective prices in all the 
'activities' the market forces would automatically lead to 
an optimal allocation of resources and thus would equalise, 
demand remaining constant, the 'partial' rate with the general 
rate of profit. In other words, the relative prices determined 
in exchange being looked upon as the driving force behind 
change (see North, 1981). But what intrigues is that despite 
high profitability the magnitude of growth remained substan-
tially low. In this section, I shall try to postulate the 
conditions of_reproduction in the light of the theoretical 
understandings of growth in the agricultural sector. Data 
would appear here more in the form of illustration. Section 
II d eals with the specific characteristics of sericulture 
and their representations in shaping the nature of cultivation 
in the specific conditions of reproduction in West Bengal. 
Silk production, including sericulture, consists of a 
chain of activities viz., mulberry cultivation, 'seed'/ 
commercial cocoon rearing, reeling, spinning/twisting, and 
weaving. In this study we will be concentrating on the stages 
of production upto reeling. In terms of 'yield per unit' the 
mulberry plants, silkworms and the reeling equipment could be 
broadly classified into (a) traditional, and (b) hiyielding/ 
hybrid,, or modern. The word 'modern' would be appropriate to 
describe the filature reeling as opposed to traditional ch_arka 
o r 'kat-qhai' (popularly called) reeling. There is another 
type of reeling known as cottage basin reeling which is an 
improved version of the traditional charka reeling.Hypo-
thetically, We can conceive of the following six different 
combinations of the traditional and modern methods of culti-
vation, rearing, and reeling : 
. .'* : •  \ - - . * ' 
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 
Combination Mulberry leaf Rearing^ Reelin_^ 
I T T T 
If T H T 
III ,, T H Filature 
IV , H H- T 
V H H Filature 
VI H T T/Filature 
/"Where, T = Traditional, H = Hi-yielding/Hybrid J 
The available information allow us to classify the 
mulberry cultivators, in West Bengal, into three groups, as 
follows : 
(a) small cultivators who put all, or the 
major proportion of land under mulberry 
and the rest under paddy; 
(b) middle cultivators who have sizeable 
land under mulberry while the greater 
part of the owned lands remains under 
other crops including paddy; and 
(c) big cultivators whose area of mulberry-
lands constitutes an insignificant 
proportion to the total cultivable land 
owned by them. 
• Cj j - . 
There is, in general, no market for mulberry leaf in 
West Bengal. The cultivators of mulberry,in turn, are 
themselves the cocoon rearers in most of the. .cases. Almost 
/ rearing though all of them own the means of production.The-next stage, i.e., 
is highly labour-intensive activity the small, and, to a 
great extent, the middle cultivators depend solely upon owi 
family-labour including women. However, to note, most of ie 
cultivators belong to group (a), and partly to group (b). 
The marginal presence of the big landowners, in general, is 
conspicuous. 
The class division in which one segment of the 
population produces surplus while the other by dint of the 
ownership of the means of production appropriates the surplus 
is not the 'rule of the game', in general, in this sphere of 
economic activity. On the other hand, the producers have 
differential access to the means of exchange. A fully 
commercialized exchange or competitive market exchange is 
yet to develop. What is apparent is a partially commercializ 
noncompetitive exchange administered by trading capital 
through a hierarchy of intermediaries. The traders' role in 
production through the system of a_dva_nce_s, or, in other words 
the 'interlinkages', however, is marginal. 
Marx characterized growing commercialization 
reflecting the dissolution of feudal forms and relations and 
a simultaneous advance towards capitalist relations —- by a 
number of features, such as : commutation of rent in terms 
of money, the displacement of crop-sharing tenancy by cash 
rents, a larger degree of monetization of outputs and inputs 
(i.e. of the proportion of inputs and outputs purchased or 
sold), increased area under cash-crops or a larger proportion 
in output of cash-crops, the rapid increase in the number of 
landless labourersadvance of productive forces mediated 
through the expanding circuit of commerce, etc. (Dobb, 1963; 
Bharadwaj, 1985). The process of commercialization entailed 
the simultaneous development of 'free' exchange relations in 
the markets of land, labour, capital, and outputs, in the 
'classic case' of capitalist development in England. 
The studies on the slow process of commercialization 
in India quite often refers to the phenomenon termed as 
'interlinked markets' (Bharadwaj, 1974; Bhaduri, 1985). A 
dominant party conjointly exploits the weaker parties in 
two or more markets by interlinking the terms of contracts. 
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For instance, the land-labour interlinkage implies that the 
landlord stipulates, as a part of the tenancy contract, 
attachment of labour services which are underpaid or unpaid. 
As corollary, the underdevelopment or muted formation of a 
capitalist market inhibits the formation and growth of a 
capitalist market in another (Bharadwaj, 1985). However, 
Bardhan and others (see articles in Bardhan, ed., 1989) try 
to argue that the potential benefits of interlinked transac-
tions are undeniable. 'Marxists often cite some of these 
production relations as institutional obstacles to development 
in a poor agrarian economy, overlooking the microeconomic 
rationale of the formation of these institutions. Under a 
set of informational constraints and missing markets, a given 
agrarian institution (say, sharecropping) may be serving 
a real economic function' (Bardhan, 1989 : 7). 
The market for sericulture output is dominated by a 
(trading) class who,in general, not engaged in the sphere of 
production. Thus, the phenomenon of 'interlinked markets' 
is not quite apparent so far as the output market is concerned. 
The markets for cocoons, silk yarn, etc. are dominated and 
controlled by the traders who operate a collusive oligopoly 
despite the lukewarm presence of government agencies. There 
are three principal agents who^procure'cocoons for reeling : 
(a) local intermediaries; (b) government filature units' 
agents — government agencies themselves; and (c) private 
small reelers. And, there are two principal agents who 
procure silkya'rn for delivery at the weavers' site : (a) the 
local intermediaries; (b) weavers' cooperative societies. 
It is found that the local intermediaries offer much less 
priceSfor the products compared to the others. It is also 
interesting to note that the local intermediaries pay higher 
prices than that their principals offer to the primary 
producers. 
We are unable to gather that the producers face 
difficulties in marketing increased volume of output which 
implies that there is no rationing of the volume of output 
to be transacted by each producer. Thus, for the free and 
risk-neutral producers there is no cost involved in searching 
for high-paying buyers provided all the three agents were 
there in the village. However, in the absence of government 
agents at the village level a transaction cost due to 
transportation is involved in cae the producers are willing 
to sell to the government agencies. It is also reported that 
some of the government agencies take a longer time to pay 
for the procured outputs. Thus, essentially the producers 
have to compare, if they were free, between the prices 
offered, primarily, by the two agents taking into account 
those factors. Assuming that the local intermediaries do 
not buy on credit the relationship between the two sets of 
prices is as follows : 
PP^.PG + T. + rt V. (1) 
1 - 1 1 1 
p where, P. = Local intermediaries price for i-th r C product; P^ = Government agencies' price for 
the i~th product; T. = Transportation cost; + 1
r = Nominal interest rate for the period 't' 
G v^ = P^ x volume of output sold to the 
government agencies. 
11 
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When equality of (1) holds it may be argued that the private 
local intermediaries are essentially providing an economic 
function, and the producers' choice of selling to them is 
voluntary. But when the L.H.S. is less than the R.H.S. and 
still the local intermediaries are the bulk purchasers of 
the output we could hardly assume that there exist bilateral 
contracts among individual actors. In fact, each agent may 
deal with several producers but each producer cannot deal 
with several agents. And contracts are not reached through 
bilateral bargaining (cf. Zusman, 1989). 
Whether or not the equality of both sides in equation 
(1) holds the private intermediaries would like to retain the 
market in their control. If they foresee any attempt on the 
part of the government agencies extending their procurement 
services to the village or local level they would immediately 
offer higher prices, and thus would try to maximize the 
gross turnover. In this sense,effective public intervention 
by bringing in competition is likely to benefit the producers 
i i 
A system of determining the prices of cocoons has 
been initiated in West Bengal on the basis of the Japanese 
concept 'Kakeme'. The Cocoon Collective Purchase Committee 
fixes up the Kakeme in every season, which becomes obligatory 
for the Silk Khadi Societies and the government reeling 
units but not for any private reeling unit. The Committee is 
formed by the representatives of the rearers and silk khadi 
units. The Deputy Director (Reeling), Malda, Deputy Director 
Regional Development Office, Central Silk Board, GOI, and one 
official from the Khadi Village Industries Commission (KVIC) 
are the ex-officio members of the Committee which is headed 
by the District Magistrate, Malda, The Kakeme is determined 
by the committee after every harvest on the basis of raw silk 
yield of the cocoons and price of the raw silk prevailing in 
the market. /In West Bengal, KVIC reeling umix and weaving 
[, too ether units/consume about 30 per cent of the total production of 
cocoon and raw silk (Chakraborty, not dated). The KVIC 
reeling units are supposed to purchase at a price determined /in fact, however^ KVIC units hardly buy from prgducers. -on The basis of Kakeme./ These show that the private traders 
in cocoons could be risk-neutral and still earn a high return 
on the gross turnover, as the 'price' is assured for them in 
the larger part of the market. 
To note, a few studies suggest that the marketing 
contracts emerge under fairly common conditions of great 
uncertainty and information asymmetry (see, for example, 
Zusman, 1989). They postulate that only intermediaries 
obtain first hand information on buyers' offers. Consequently 
according to them,such contracts often feature risk-sharing 
• • v 
and incentive provisions in addition to price-like terms of 
exchange (ibid). In the case of sericulture in West Bengal, 
however, the producers may not suffer from information-gap 
but their uncertainty is high due to the predominance of the 
private intermediaries. 
There are evidence to suggest the existence of a few 
'big' traders who together controls a large part of the 
private markets of cocoon and yarn in West Bengal. In a 
situation when the buyers in the final market are having 
complete information on prices the possibility of price-
manipulation by the traders through competition among 
themselves is unlikely. Those 'big' traders would instead 
form a market-sharing cartel. Each oligopolist having an 
exclusive 'zone of operation' — the quotas. The intermediari 
operating under the respective principals provide the main 
pillars to this type of market structure. The intermediaries 
are instrumental in restricting the movements of the producers 
from market .to market for higher prices. The producers have 
to sell out to the local intermediary. The regional level 
intermediaries would discourage the producers to sell directly 
to them by way of offering much less prices than those were 
offered by the local intermediaries. This battery of 
t 
intermediaries, in a sense, for the respective oligopolists, 
provides a hedge against future 'uncertainty' (in terms of 
gross turnover) in case the 'collusion' ceases and the 
oligopolists themselves have to enter into competition with 
each other in order to maximize the gross turnover. This kind 
of an elaborate structure of the market is consistent with 
the relatively high frequency of 'harvest (4 to 7 'crops' a 
year) compared to, say, paddy. The expected annual income 
of each member in this market network isjfikely to be ensured 
because of the high frequency of turnover. 
The oligopolist traders along with the battery of 
intermediaries exercise domination over an agrarian 'labour also 
force'. They are/able to put effective resistance to the 
extension of the government agencies'marketing services 
to the producers. 
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The extra-economic coercion can not be ruled out 
in such a market structure. Although it is not truly an 
impersonal exchange process still it is capable of generating 
considerable scope for all kinds of opportunistic behaviour 
(cheating, shirking) as opposed to the observations made by 
Bardhan (1989). The oligopolist traders are very likely to 
undermine the quality of goods and 'force' the cultivators 
to sell out at below the 'normal' price. 
The market thus gets 'fragmented'. The market is 
fragmented in the sense that the producers face different 
effective prices for the produced goods (while information 
on the prevailing prices in other 'markets' are available to 
the producers). This restricts private 'initiatives' as 
prevailing prices need'not reflect true economic scarcity 
and, as a result, they would fail to recognize the socially 
profitable investment opportunity in this area of production 
(McKinnon, 1973: chp.2). 
This structure of market thwarts the precipitation 
of craft specialization. Instead of selling the mulberry 
leaves in the 'market' the cultivators would prefer to go on 
to the next stage, that is rearing activity with own-leaves, 
and then to reeling own cocoons. This would enable them to 
increase the amount of value-added with own labour and, at 
the same time, by reducing the number of commercial 
transactions, decrease the proportion of economic surplus 
that is supposed to be appropriated by the traders by extra-
economic means. There is, as well, little incentive to go 
in for 'modernization* in such a system. However, the 
demand for money for transaction needs, at the same time, 
may put pressure upon the cultivators to dispense with the 
production instead of going in for the next stage. 
The small and, to a great extent, the middle 
cultivators depend primarily upon the family labour while 
the required intensity of labour is very high in the rearing 
of silkworms. Given the limit to the extent of utilization 
of the family labour further extension of cultivation would 
call for hired labour. The rural 'labour market1 is, however, 
underdeveloped in the sense that there prevails a single 
notion of wages and which is being fixed by custom, paternalism, 
or social sanctions. The differentiation in the labour market 
according to skills or intensity of labour-power is yet to 
develop. In general, the supply - demand imbalance gets 
reflected only in marginal seasonal variations within a 
given range of wages. This is usually considered as the 
subsistence wage although it may not be sufficient for 
reproduction of labour-power. The rearing of cocoons too is 
considered, in general, to be a variety of agricultural 
activity while, in practice, the type of job and the intensity 
that is required from a hired labour is different. As a 
result there happens to be an ex-ante imbalance between the 
demand and supply of hired labour reflecting the difference 
between the wage-rate that is. being offered and the one 
at which labour would be available. Paradoxically, there 
is high incidence of unemployment among both rural male and 
female, in general, and among scheduled castes, in particular, 
in West Bengal (NSS, 38th and 43rd Rounds). 
Bardhan (1984) observes that, with a few exceptions, 
the wage rate for casual labour is remarkably uniform within 
the village, and workers recognized by the employer as 
belonging to different ability types do not get paid at 
significantly different wage rates. Perhaps, as Bardhan 
argues, this is the employer's unwillingness to create 
invidious distinctions among his workers which may lead to 
problems of morale and tension among them (1984 : 71). The 
Bardhan - Rudra 1979 survey also found that in many villages 
there is open or tacit collusion of big employers in the 
labour market, and in some villages one big employer provides 
"leadership" in setting the wage rate, which the others follow 
(see Bardhan, 1984 : 60) . 
The villages or regions where the poor and small 
peasants are substantially engaged in sericulture the shortage 
of free labour to employ is significant. Secondly, the 
employer is keen on employing the "known" village labour 
rather than in hiring "outsiders" about whose work ability 
and particularly the dependability characteristics they do 
not possess enough information (Bardhan, 1984 : chp.4). 
/"Here,we do not intend to discuss the scojoe of the system of 
labour attachment or labour - credit interlinkage (the Dadan_ 
system) 7* "the other hand, the empirical study on West 
Bengal by Rudra and Bardhan (1983) reveals that 95 per cent 
of the casual labourers are not willing to offer work for 
lower than the ruling wage rate to get more work (chp. 1.11.4). 
Thus, it may appear that the relatively high 
profitability in the sector is nothing but higher returns 
t 
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to the relatively scarce/of production, i.e., the labour. 
The pure neoclassical theory of induced technological 
innovations suggest that the particular rate and bias_ of 
technological change would be in response to the market 
forces provided there are profit - maximizing entrepreneurs. 
The role of technology is to allow an increase in factor 
substitution away from the factors that have become relatively 
more expensive. 
The technological advance in sericulture includes HYV 
leaves (requiring inorganic fertilisers, pesticides, and 
measured irrigation), and hybrid silkworms. The land and 
labour being two primary factors of production the capital 
goods can be decomposed between those that substitute for 
land and those that substitute for labour (Sen, 1968; Janvry, 
et. a_l., 1989). The land-saving capital is usually identified 
with particularly the inputs of mulberry cultivation, and 
which takes the form of biological, chemical, and water control 
investments increasing the yield per unit of land. If the land 
is cultivated by tractors and such other machinery and 
equipment it is usually identified as labour-saving capital. 
In the sericulture the labour - saving capital could also 
be identified with investments in improved silkworms for rearing 
apart from the other related investments such as improved 
rearing-house, room heater, increased number of trayS, etc. 
The capital is labour-saving as it increases the output of 
cocoons (in terms of weight) per unit of labour-time spent. 
For instance, with marginal increase/in the intensity of 
L and 
labour (in terms of attention)/given the same labour-time, 
while about 450 kgs. of mulberry leaves produce about 13 kgs. 
of 'Nistari1 (traditional variety) cocoons the same leaves 
could produce about double amount of hybrid variety of 
cocoons. The technological change, however, at the same 
time, enhances the 'risk'. It gets reduced increasingly 
with the availability of 'information' regarding the 
aopropriate conditions of adoption of the technology and the 
appropriate disease control mechanism. 
The studies by Williamson (1985), Stiglitz (1986, 
1989), Janvry et.al. (1989) show that when transaction costs 
are taken into account optimum technology, as opposed to the 
pure neoclassical theory of induced innovations, becomes 
conditional on the.distribution of assets and, consequently, 
there no longer exists a single optimum choice across farms. 
Similarly, if the public research institutions (the monopolist 
of scientific knowledge) do not act according to the changes 
in relative factor prices and instead keep on changing the 
general level of technology there may occur difference in the 
rate of technological change in land-saving and labour-saving 
capital. This availability of a spectrum of technologies in 
turn, may explain user's certain bias of the technological 
change between land and labour irrespective of market 'signals' 
(Thirtle, 1985; Janvry, 1989). 
The specific conditions under which sericulture is 
undertaken are that (a) there is hardly any economies of 
scale in production (mulberry cultivation as well as rearing), 
(b) landownership is unequally distributed, (c) land market is 
underdeveloped — crop-sharing is preferred to the changes 
in the ownership of land, (d) the availability of institutional 
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credit is directly proportional to the size of the owned 
land. Under these conditions the response of the two sets 
of cultivators — small and medium together, and the big 
— — to the technological change would be different. 
The rate of diffusion of the advanced technology is 
expected to be higher in the case of big landowners whose 
investment decisions axe ought to be influenced by the high 
wage rate or shortage of labour, as it is interpreted. 
Their easy access to institutional credit and the 'information 
on technology' (because of, among others, relatively high 
literacy rate) otherwise would have induced them to invest 
in labour-saving capital. Instead, the small and middle 
cultivators while, at least, for the sake of rationalization, 
would like to invest in land-saving capital their decisions 
would be restricted by the availability of credit, and the 
flow of 'information' too. If the utilization of the family 
- labour had reached the 'saturation' point they would also 
like to undertake investments in the labour-saving capital. 
But again the same set ofv restrictions would be binding. 
Of course, informal credit market is there, and the 
availability of that is not simply related to the size of 
ownership of land but on various other factors (see Datta, 
1990). The interest rate being much higher compared to that 
of the institutional credit the incentive to invest in 
advanced technology with borrowed capital should come from 
the output - market in the form of 'premium' for the 'risks' 
and uncertainties. Even if initial investible resources of 
the farmers are sufficient for such technological innovations 
the specific market-structure is one of the factors that may 
inhibit investments. 
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Thus, the traditional species of worm which could be 
fed with traditional variety of leaf would be preferred to 
exotic variety, The traditional charka (kat-ghai) is quite 
likely to be the optimum technology of reeling own limited 
volume of cocoons, which would otherwise have been marketed, 
even though the rate of 'recovery* of silk be as low as 50-60 
per cent compared to that in modern filature. Following 
Hicks (1969) one may describe such a peasant economy as 'The 
Customary Economy' which is based on traditional rules and 
norms, and can survive in a fairly tranquil environment of 
no risks (or fairly calculable risks) and more or less 
repetitive decisions. 
In traditional areas where substantial number of 
small cultivators are engaged in sericulture even horizontal 
expansion of the 'traditional technology' is restricted by 
the scarcity of land. The increase in output thus would 
depend upon the investments of the big cultivators in this 
economic activity. The big cultivators by dint of their 
collective economic, social and political power could 
circumvent much of the difficulties faced by others in the 
input, output and credit markets. More often they do not 
require the credit in order to.undertake investments in this 
field. The 'information' on advanced technology is also 
relatively easily available to them as (a) the literacy-rate 
is relatively high among them, (b) they possess radio, 
television, etc. through which public agencies introduce the 
'cultivators' to new methods, and (c) they have relatively 
easy access to the public research institutions by way of 
undergoing training courses, etc. offered by those. Thus 
they, unlike the small cultivators, co not have to depend 
upon the extension services of the government agencies at 
the village level. In addition, there is the labour-saving 
technology available to make the investments profitable for 
them. 
Given the 'pressure' on land,and the set of imperfect 
markets the choice would be exercised, by big landowners, in 
between self-cultivation and tenancy-cultivation which may 
not necessarily be guided by economic rationality. Of course, 
the transaction costs in the form of supervising hired labour, 
in sericulture, would be high. At the same time, sericulture 
gives the highest return on investment in agriculture. 
Bardhan (1984) observes: 'If there were a complete set of 
perfect market, tenancy would have been theoretically 
uninteresting or insignificant' (p.95). 
It is found that in the traditional areas where the 
demand for land is high and coming mostly from the small 
cultivators the big landowners who are in sericulture for a 
pretty long time are now entering into sharecropping tenancy-t 
cultivation. This is symptomatic of the fact that share-
cropping is preferred to by the ^^otooneofoDoc1»landowners. 
In new areas, on the other hand, the demand for land for 
mulberry is low and hence the tenancy-cultivation may not 
be as profitable as it is in the traditional areas. Even 
then there is hardly any big farming. Perhaps this may be 
partly expalined by the relatively high production uncertainty. 
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In general, however, both in the traditional and new areas, 
it is evident that the big landowners are risk-averse. In 
turn, the availability of land, even on crop-sharing contract, 
for mulberry cultivation would be difficult. Because the 
nature of 'contract' would certainly differ from those exist 
in traditional crops to which the 'traditional' big landowners 
are comfortable. In other words, this may be explained in 
terms of differential monitoring costs (see Datta and Nugent, 
1981) . 
The way in which a farmer organizes production, given 
alternative investment opportunities in agriculture in order 
to maximize the rate of return is an important indicator by 
which the farmer could be characterized as either a capitalist 
or 'traditional'. The relative prices of the agricultural 
crops, food as well as commercial, the agro-climatic conditions, 
and other technological factors together determines the 
'rational1 choice of the cOfEjposition of crops to be cultivated. 
However, the underdeveloped markets may act as the counter-
vailing factors. 
.- • fe • • • . 
In a broader framework of reference, the phenomenon 
rof 'shift' to the cultivation of HYV paddy and wheat by the 
rich farmers, during the late '60s and early '70s motivated 
scholars to enter into the debate on the 'mode of production' 
in Indian agriculture (most of the articles appeared in various 
issues of the Economic and Political Weekly during 1970s). 
On the basis of data on various related factors, such as, 
concentration of land, investments in implements, etc. many 
of the studies suggest that capitalism today dominates Indian 
agriculture (e.g. Patnaik, 1971, 1972, 1976; Rudra, 1974, 
1978; Harriss, 1979; Thorner, 1982). Following them it 
seems a capitalist 'class' has taken shape in Indian 
agriculture. However, a 'class' as is being located in 
relation to the rest of the society could be ia^ntified, 
in the same vein, by its class-consciousness the contours 
of which develop out of the particular ways the individuals, 
as a group, operate in the politico-economic arenas. 
Specifically, the 'rational' economic hehaviour of the 
capitalis t farmer, of course, is assumed to be that the farmer 
respond to the market signals so as to maximize the gross 
return. Accordingly, the paradox of high relative profita-
bility and the marginal presence of the rich farmers, in 
West Bengal, in the commercial cultivation of mulberry 
remains unexplained by the hypothesis. The weakness of the 
hypothesis, it seems, is located in the fact that it has 
given marginal attention to the role of the state in providing 
irrigation facilities, fertilisers and implements at subsidized 
prices, liberal bank credits,, and, finally, a market with 
guaranted prices for the outputs — the system of government 
procurement — and, the subsequent role of the rich farmers, 
in a practically 'zero risk' situation. 
What nature made distinct, the market makes homo-
geneous. When the 'logic' of the capitalist market is 
inoperative, as Polanyi (1957) suggests, the substantive 
meaning of "economic" usurp the formal meaning. The latter 
derives from logic, the former from fact. 'The formal meaning 
implies a set of rules referring to choice between the 
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alternative uses of insufficient means. The substantive 
meaning implies neither choice nor insufficiency of means; 
man's livelihood may or may not involve the necessity of 
choice and, if choice there be, it need not be induced by 
the limiting effect of a "scarcity1' of the means' (Polanyi, 
1957 : 243-4). There is, for instance, scientific method 
of getting rid of the outbreak of the 'muscardine' disease, 
and which is not unknown to the cultivators. Yet in many 
cases it is found that the cultivators act according to 
their 'beliefs'. The'modern'method would suggest cleanliness, 
maintaining proper humidity and ventilation, etc,, inside the 
rearing room along with burning the dead worms and using 
Formalin chaff/Diathene. Instead, the cultivators keep 
their domestic animals like cow, goats locked inside the 
rearing room continuously for 3-4 days on the belief that 
those animals would 'consume' the disease. 
Finally, what explains the predominance of Muslims 
and the so-called "backward" Hindu-castes such as Mahisya, 
Chai-Mondal, Paundra-Khatriya in small-scale 'rearing' and 
kat-ghai reeling activities ? Perhap's, the prepondarance 
of the close correspondance between the hierarchy of caste 
and economic activity, the status of the job in the society, 
and the status of the women and children, who perform crucial 
role in sericulture, in the families of the respective 
communities together could explain the phenomenon. The social 
division of labour is yet to take shape on the basis of 
economic calculations. Historically, after the rapid decline 
of the silk industry in Bengal, during the late nineteenth 
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and early twentieth centuries,/the survival of the silk 
L place, could be traced 
production, til] the recent development took/in those commu-
nities only, in a few districts. 
II. The Data4 
The silkworm rearing is done, in West Bengal, in 
the following six seasons : April (Baishakhi), May (jaistha), 
June (Shrabani), August (Bhaduri), November-December 
(Agrahayani), and February-March (Falgooni). Depending on 
the availability of the mulberry leaves five to six cocoon 
crops could be harvested at intervals of 2 to 2^ - months. 
However, there is a difference of 8 to 24 days, in the seasons, 
in between different districts.. This is partly explained by 
jlinunqs of sowing and harvesting of foodcrops, and 
harvesting of mojor commercial crops like mango. 
There are a few characteristics of the techno-
economics of sericulture which distinguish it from other 
activities. First, the soils for mulberry cultivation 
should be deep, well-drained, clayey loam to loam in texture, 
friable, porous and with good moisture holding capacity. 
Slightly acidic soils which.are free from injurious salts 
are ideal for good growth of mulberry plants. Even the 
saline and alkaline soils could be improved for cultivation 
by the application of gypsum or sulphur or by green manuring 
(Ullal and Narasimhanna, 1987 : 10). Obviously, the land-
improvement costs are there but compared to the profitability 
of the sector those costs appear to be marginal. Moreover, 
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it shows that the land-scarcity as an argument for the slow 
growth of the sector is partial. The technological progress 
in mulberry plants has rendered the cultivation possible in 
a variety of lands (Source : Central Sericulture Research & 
Training Institute, CSB, Baharampur). While irrigation is 
an important input in raising the leaf yields an additional 
advantage in West Bengal is that adequate annual rainfall and 
the water retention capacity of the alluvial soil together 
does not call for an elaborate system of irrigation in many 
regions of the state. 
Secondly, there is an optimum ratio- of the fixed 
to working capital, the.adherence to which minimizes the risk 
and uncertainty, and maximizes the returns to the farmer. 
To elaborate, the fixed capital components are : land under 
mulberry, rearing house, laying and spinning trays, and 
some other instruments such as, room-heater, hygrometer, etc. 
These together determines the volume of working capital to 
be employed, i.e. the amount of silkworm eggs (in short 
'seed') to be reared. For instance, improved variety mulberry 
leaf production (about 32 quintals per season) on a land of 
about 0.66 acre could feed about 400 hybrid variety (F^/jaya) 
disease free layings (dfls.) /"implying eggs laid by 400 
months*/ (see Table 2 ). Then, to rear 400 dfls., at least 
52 rearing trays and 25 spinning trays are required. To 
place those trays in an arranged order, 4 racks are needed. 
And a room of the size 22ft. x 10ft. x 10ft. is required to 
accommodate those 4 racks, in addition to the free space 
needed on the floor for 2 trays at a time. If the techno-
logically determined proportions were violated and instead 
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the trays are over-crowded with more number of seeds, there 
would be negative economies in the sense that the growth of 
the larvat would be restricted because of inadequate feeding 
and, at the same time, diseases would make the larva mortality-
rate higher. 
Thirdly, the initial capital requirement, for good 
quality cocoon rearing, is high. For instance, the cultiva-
tion of mulberry on a land of one acre, in absence of the 
direct market for the leaves, would call for such types of 
assets (as discussed above) the market value of which, in 
aggregate, may well be in the range of Rs. 14-17,000/-, 
including a mud-built rearing house(for details see Note 4 
of Table 1) . However, to start with, most of the cultivators 
use the dwelling rooms for the .purpose. In such case, a sum 
of about Rs.^000/« would be needed as initial capital to buy 
the equipments (for rearing about 400 dfls, in each season). 
It could be reduced further by hiring the required equipments. 
In addition, there is the cost of cultivation of mulberry itself 
(see Appendix I) along with the requirement of working capital f 
to buy the 'seeds'. 
Fourthly, the family labour, especially the labour 
of the women in the family plays a crucial role. Silkworm 
rearing calls for intensive attention as well as mother's 
care, especially, during the later stage of the larva. 
Identifying and then collecting mature silkworms and putting 
on the spinning trays require a great deal of skilled and 
intensive labour. Moreover, there is hardly any time-speci-
fic routine. The work goes on round-the-clock, with intervals. 
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These beget problem of getting hired-labour at the wage-rate 
that prevails in other agricultural activities. However, 
the availability of •free-time' from the members of the 
family is constrained by the extent of engagement of the 
household in the cultivation of other crops and the related 
works such as, rice-boiling, drying, etc. Notwithstanding, 
the small and medium farmers primarily depend on the family 
labour including children as, apparently, there is no 'cost' 
involved in engaging them excepting for/those households 
who consider the education of child,£a better alternative. 
Fifthly, the 'information/knowledge' of technology 
is instrumental 
in ma king the cultivation a profitable venture. 
This includes the nature of feeding, temperature and humidity 
to be maintained inside the rearing room, identification of 
the stages of growth of the larva by size, shape and colour,and 
the diseased worms, the knowledge of proper pest control, etc. 
In the 'traditional' areas of cultivation the traditional 
variety of worm, that is Nlstari, does not create much problems 
to the cultivators as the 'knowledge' is transmitted to them 
through generations. By contrast, the cultivation of hybrid 
'crops' necessarily depends upon the flow of 'information' 
from the government agencies who monopolize the technical 
know-how. The cost of 'learning by doing' is very high in 
this case. However, once the 'information' percolates down 
to the cultivators it may propagate horizontally, through 
the cultivators themselves, sometimes through skilled rearers 
who out-migrate due to economic reasons, or migration of 
women from the sericulture areas as a result of marriage, etc. 
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Yet updating of the knowledge by field-level demonstration 
is an essential part of increasing the productivity and 
decreasing the risks of the cultivators. 
Sixthly, the sericulture output to a great extent 
depends upon the availability of disease free layings. 
There are various sources of 'seeds', and unless the quality 
is strictly controlled, so far as the reproduction of the 
moths is concerned, the entire 'forward' linkages would be 
affected. However, the 'quality' could not be guaged simply 
by the appearance of the 'seeds' in the 'market-place'. The 
availability of disease free layings is ensured only by a 
scientific method of rearing of seed-cocoon and getting 
those seeds tested by microscope. 
So far as the availability of land for the cultivation 
of mulberry is concerned the constraints are more institutional, 
in nature, than factors like 'opportunity cost' of land. The 
rich soil of the state makes the per unit yield of mulberry to 
be the highest in India — about 240 quintals per hectare 
(GoWB, not dated), and that too under rainfed condition. In 
spite of that, unlike, say, Karnataka, the cultivation is 
concentrated merely in a few locations. Out of a total of 
36,000 acres of land under mulberry, in 1988, the district of 
Malda alone constituted about 48-50 per cent. The bulk of the 
rest are shared by Murshidabad (5,259 acres), and Birbhum 
(4,440 acres) (GoWB). The average, mulberry land per cultivating 
household is also very low — about 0.45 acre with marginal 
variation over the districts /"Source : Dept. of Sericulture, 
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GoWB (unpublished district-wise data) /. This shows the 
predominance of small cultivators in this sphere of activities. 
The major cash crops replaced, in the new areas, are 
jute in Malda, Murshidabad, West Dinajpur (about 2,700 acres 
under mulberry), and sugar cane in Birbhum /""Source : Dept. 
of Sericulture, ibid /. According to an estimate (GoWB, not 
dated), net income from the mulberry cultivation together 
with silkworm rearing per bigha of land was P% 5,996, in 1984, 
while that from sugar cane was Rs.1500, mustard seed Rr#935, 
'Aman' paddy R?.9l0, Jute Rs.844, 'Boro' paddy Rs.689, and from 
wheat Rs.379, in West Bengal, which includes the costs of 
family labour. 
The space of sericulture in the state could be 
classified into high-concentration and low--con cent .rat ion 
areas. The high-concentration areas are usually the tradi-
tionally cultivated areas where cultivation is on for last 
50 years, or even more. In the latter areas the 'price' of 
land suitable for mulberry has gone up to twice that of the 
usual paddy-land (about Rs.24-25,000 per 'bigha' or 0.34 acre). 
The small cultivators who are willing to expand the activity 
are thus forced to migrate to other places. This migration 
has been a signifacant factor in the development of seri-
culture in new areas. 
The traditionalltyhas rendered some places with the 
concentration of mulberry lands. A few farmers having 4-6 
acres of land under mulberry, and selling leaves to rearers, 
t 
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in those areas (for instance, Bhadrapur in Birbhum, Sujapur 
and Kaliachak in Malda) are evident. Moreover, the high 
demand for land, coming mostly from small cultivators, in 
those areas has been instrumental, to some extent, in 
transforming the system of self-cultivation by the big 
farmers to cultivation by share-tenants. There are various 
forms to tenancy cultivation. Of which, sharing the mulberry 
crops only (fixed rent or actual crop-yield basis) without 
sharing the cost of cultivation is quite frequent. In that 
case the monitoring costs of the landlord is minimum. There 
is also the type of contract by which the landlord does not 
share the costs, of mulberry cultivation and the harvest is not 
distributed. After harvest,, the landlord gives 'seeds' and, 
sometimes, the equipment, e.g. the laying and spinning trays 
i 
which amounts to a form of production credit to the cultivator-
rearer, and ultimately shares 75 per cent of the cocoon-yield. 
Although this interlocking of the land-lease contract and the .may 
credit contract/enhance, the monitoring costs of the landlord the 
but yet that might be less than the costs of monitoring/hired 
labour. Socondly, the landlord thus could avoid hiring labour 
at higher wages. In contrast, in new areas generally the big 
landowners who #©o<>t>o cultivate the traditional crop-mix by 
the share-croppers are aversed to mulberry cultivation. Since 
best of the lands are mostly owned by them this has affected 
the growth of the activity. The possibility can not be ruled 
out that the small cultivators too in the new areas are not 
willing to pay 3/4th of the crop as part of the tenancy 
contract after bearing the risks and uncertainty on their own 
which, among others, also appear due to the marketability 
conditions. Thus, the terms which are acceptable to 
'traditional'cultivators may not be so to'new'cultivators. 
The rearers in the traditional areas have developed 
'expectations' out of the observed 'cycle' of failure and 
success over a long period of time. That would, of course, 
be different from the calculation of costs of uncertainty 
by a cultivator in new area. 
Thus, while expansion over space is theoretically 
possible in the new areas the expansion in the hi-concentra-
tion areas would largely depend upon the scope of moderni-
zation. It is found that the comparatively low yielding 
Nistari variety of silk-worms are widely cultivated in the 
traditional areas. The rationale could be that these worms 
not only consume relatively less amount of leaf but as well 
could survive on the traditional variety of mulberry leaf. 
Moreover, 'traditional knowledge' is more or less adequate 
to rearing 'Nistari' worms, and no additional risk is 
involved. In addition, the persistence of the fragmented 
market-type institution, as discussed in Section I, has 
generated a strong repulsion to the immediate sell of the 
cocoons KksR&xKrxpBssikiK? to the intermediaries. Instead, 
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the cultivators prefer to go in for silk-yarn production. 
The traditional charka. or j<aj^ -£hai which could be installed 
with their limited resources turns out to be relativelv 
profitable to processing those Nistari cocoons. It is rather 
uneconomic to reeling those cocoons in modern filature as 
there are frequent discontinuities in the long stretch (about 
250 metres) of yarn. On the other hand, if hybrid cocoons 
are reeled in kat-qhais the rate of recovery of silk from 
those cocoons would be about 60-70 per cent of that in the 
filature entailing a loss in gross return as hybrid worms 
consume much more leaves, almost double, compared to Nistari 
(see Table 2). 
The small holdings of lands which could produce 
adequate leaves for the existing numbers of'Nistari' silk-
worms reared would no longer remain economic for the same 
number of 'hybrid' rearing. While about 450 kg. of mulberry 
leaf is required to rear 100'dfls. of pure 'Nistari' the 
requirement for the same number of hybrid bivoltine is about 
750 kg., and for pure bivoltine about 900 kg. 
Moreover, the hybrid silkworms are by nature quite 
delicate and are highly sensitive to environmental conditions. 
The atmospheric temperature and humidity prevailing inside the 
room at the time of rearing, and the specific methods of 
rearing adopted, such as feeding, cleaning, spacing, etc., 
• ' . . , i - w - i .  ... I 
nave important bearing upon the productivity. The high 
productivity of good quality cocoons of very high silk 
content is ensured only when those factors are properly taken 
care of. On the other hand, this particular cultivation 
would also entail a relatively higher investments in 'means' 
such as, laying and spinning trays, disinfectants, proper 
room-space, etc. Most of the cultivators use their dwelling 
rooms which are not properly 'hygenic' for :sooh rearing. 
The construction of a 'model' rearing house (with mud-walls) 
may cost anything between Rs.10-15,000. Moreover, the 'shift' 
to hybrid rearing would automatically make the cultivators 
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dependent upon agencies who monopolize the knowledge of 
perfect rearing of hybrid cocoons,which again changes at 
intervals of time. Any untidy attempt on the part of those 
agencies to propagate the 'knowledge' would disturb the 
balance and lead to a disaster for the cultivators. There 
are evidence to show that cultivators once introduced to the 
hybrid 'crop' by the government agencies, and because, due to 
lack of manpower or other reasons,those agencies later 
failed to attend the cultivators periodically, they sub-
sequently gave up the cultivation after incurring huge 
losses. The illiteracy is partly responsible in the sense 
that the cultivators could not follow the printed literature. 
In the low-concentration areas (mostly new areas) 
although there is a greater degree of availability of land 
for mulberry the big cultivators* response is found to be 
lackadaisical. The government agencies have played a 
crucial role in extending the cultivation to new areas. 
But at the same time the whole .efforts of those agencies 
are concentrated in introducing the cultivation of hybrid 
'seeds' alongwith hi-yielding varieties of mulberry plants 
which require higher doses of fertilisers, etc. The 
technologically determined high ratio of fixed "to working 
capital, moreover, calls for relatively high initial 
investments. Naturally, that acts potentially as a hedge 
against the marginal farmers who have limited resources to 
invest in. Yet it is true that, the cultivators who own 
at the most 2 biqhas of cultivable lands and those, if 
suitable for mulberry, could be utilized most profitably 
<V 
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in sericulture. This is how the private money lenders' 
role gets strengthened, where extension efforts of the 
government agencies are not followed by adequate institu-
tional loans. 
The upward mobility of the marginal cultivators is 
however, restricted by the capital-bias of the 'new' 
technology of production, and subsequently the limited 
availability of land and the institutional loans. For 
instance, any further expansion of the present volume of 
'seeds' (say, 300-350 dfls.'FL') which could be fed with the 
improved variety (say, S^) of leaves produced on the existing 
size of the land (say, 0.66 acre) and reared in the existing 
rearing room (of size, say, 22ft. x 10ft. x 10 ft.) would be 
economic only when the land-size as well as the room-size 
are increased. However, the concept of 'marginal' change in 
this respect is hardly applicable. 
The existing system of 'price discrimination' also 
acts as disincentive to technological innovation. For 
instance, in a particular season, while the private traders 
paid Rs.40-45 for a kilogram of Nistari green cocoons and 
Rs. 50-55 for ,Fi' race (Nistari X Bi) cocoons the government 
agencies bought the same at R?.60-65, and Rs.75-80, respectively. 
The'government' prices for the dry.cocoons were still higher 
— for 'Nistari' Rs.100, and both for F^ and 'Jaya (Pure 
Mysore X Bi) Rs.125-130. The private traders, in general, do 
not adequately compensate for dry cocoons. Unlike traditional 
areas the new areas are yet to adopt the kat-ghai reeling. 
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And„ since cocoons are perishable commodity which could be 
hoarded for not more than 60 days the cultivators have to 
sell their stocks at whatever prices they ar$ offerred. 
Moreover, the traders' practise of discounting a certain 
percentage of the actual weight of the produce too is an 
accepted fact. The assessment of raw silk yield from the 
cocoon lots, by the traders, is also arbitrary. The 
situation is marginally better in'the traditional areas 
since the growth of the local reeling units (mostly tradi-
tional and the total cost of installation of which does not 
exceed Rf.1,000) provide an alternative vent for the produce. 
However, the general practise of those reelers is to buy the 
cocoons from the cultivators, in excess of the quantity of 
own cocoons, on credit. And the payments are subject to the 
realization of the money from selling out of the.yarns. 
The oligopolistic control of the traders, however, 
surfaces more prominently in the yarn market. The small 
producers who could not carry their yarn output to markets, 
say, in Bangalore,or Benaras for selling at higher prices 
have to sell to the immediate buyers — agents of the big 
traders. There are evidence that the big traders refused 
to pay as much prices as their agents were willing to pay, 
whenever the producers attempted to take their output 
directly to them. The differences between the prices 
offerred by the local intermediaries and the oligopolist 
traders are sometimes to the tune of fc.60 per kg. of yarn. 
More the spatial distance of the 'bigger market' from the 
location of production more is the margin between the two 
sets of prices. 
Both the Central Silk Board (CSB) and the sericul-
ture department of the Government of West Bengal buy cocoons 
from the cultivators through their respective regional 
offices. But while CSB takes at the most a day for the 
payments to the sellers the state's sericulture department 
takes, in genera]., more than three months and in some cases 
even more than six months to pay for the cocoons. Tentatively, 
those two government agencies together buy about 10 to 15 per 
cent of the cocoons produced in the state. The delay in 
payments together with the limited resources to buy more of 
the cocoons produced has made the State-run modern filature 
unit^at^A/jadhughat (in Malda)^ loosing concern, and another 
filature/at Berhampore/a ncn-sVar^e^^^Te3 volume of cocoons 
that the government agencj.es could procure hardly satisfies 
20-25 per cent of the requirement to 'run' the filature unit 
at Madhughat at its installed capacity. 
The limited resources of the state's sericulture 
department has restrained further the required expansion of 
the departmental activities at the grass-rcot level in the 
form of employing more field-demonstrators and related man-
power. At present a field officer, in general, is used to 
'cover' about 3 blocks of villages. All these came to tte 
in the way of effective dissemination of the knowledge of 
sericulture. The promotional policies, de facto, have 
reduced to paying departmental subsidies and helping, in a 
limited way, a small number of cultivators to acquire 
institutional loans. All these together would show why despit 
their active presence the government agencies could not thwart 
the forces of stagnation. 
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Notes 
1. The country charkha/kat-qhai is a simple appliance (costs 
about TT.^OO/^)which is manually operated by two persons, 
viz. a reeler and a turner. There are inbuilt inadequacies 
in this appliance which severely restrict the scope for 
reeling quality silk. The cottage basin is an 
improvement over the charkha. Five to'Ten basins can be 
conveniently operated by fractional motors so that the 
'yield' per unit of time is much higher than that of 
the country charkha. The cost of a basin is about Rs.1000/-
without re-reeling attachment (Ullal and Narasimhanna, 
1987: 163). Moreover, the cottage basin is capable of 
producing higher quality silk. The filature on the other 
hand is a large factory where the high" quality of reeled 
silk is ensured by the use of advanced process - technology. 
There is also a scale-economy associated with the filature. 
2. J<akeme : First, the rate of discount due to the weight 
oF'tTfe dead pupae is determined (say, 52%). Secondly, 
the percentage of silk recovery from dry cocoon is fixed 
(say, 35% of net weight). Thirdly, the increase/decrease 
in the cost of production of cocoon is taken into account. 
3. Transaction costs refer to the cost of information and 
of negotiating, monitoring, supervising, coordinating, 
and enforcing contracts (Janvry, 1989). 
4. Wherever the source of the information is not mentioned 
it is to be presumed that the data were generated out 
of the pilot survey that I undertook in the districts 
of Malda, Murshidabad, and Birbhum in West Bengal in 
November, 1989. 
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Table 1 
Net income from rearing 400 dfls. of (Ni X Bi) TF^T hybrid 
silkworm eggs per season in 1989-90 (approx.) 
A. Costs R?. 
1. Cost of silkworm eggs : 400 dfls. @ R<-.80/-
per 100 dfls.1 32o/~ 
^• Labour^cost. : 
a) 1st and 3rd age - 12days, 3 labours per day^ 648/-
b) 4th and 5th age - 12 day, 4 labours per day 864/-
c) Spinning stage - 2 days, 5 labours per day 180/-
3 3. Cost of 3,000 kg. of leaf @ Rs*0.56 per kg.1" 
750 kg. of leaf per 100 dfls ,J\ 1,680/-
4. Formalin, Paraffin paper, etc. 100/-
5. Transportation charges 50/-
4 5 / 6. Depreciation of fixed assets @ 10% per annum 400/-
TOTAL : (say) 4,250/-
11,000/-
6,7 50/-
........ c Contd. 
B. Gross sales 
6 
200 kg. of cocoon © Rs.55/- per kg. 
/"Cocoon production : 100 'dfls. = 50 kg. J 
C. Net income (say) 
: 37 
Contd 
Source : The requirement of labour-time is as calculated in 
Ullal and Narasimhanan (1987 : 136). 
Notes ; 1) Rs.100/- per 100 dfls. of PM X Bi - the 
government agencies' rate. 
2) Wage rate is assumed to be Rs.18/- per day. 
3) See Appendix I. 
4) The schedule of the fixed assets is, as follows : 
Is. 
(a) Rearing house of size 22'xlO'xlO' - 10-12,000/-
(b) Rearing bamboo trays - 52 nos. 
@ Rs.35/- each 1,820/-
(c) Spinning bamboo trays - 25 nos. 
@ Rs.55/- each 1,375,/-
(d) Hygrometer and other instruments 500,/-
(e) Bamboo rearing stand (rack) - 4 nos. 1,000/-
(f) Miscellaneous (like nets, etc.) 500/-
Total : 15-17,000/-
5) Assuming 4 crops a year; per annum depreciation, 
on an average, being Rs.l600/~ (cf. Note 4). 
6) This is the price at which the private traders, on 
an average, buy cocoons compared to Rs.75-80/-
that the government agencies (like Madhughat 
Filature Unit) pay for those. The local reelers, 
however, pay about Rs,60. 
Table 2. 
Quantity of silkworm eggs ( variety-wise) that could 
be reared economically in the 4 different seasons 
with improved (S^) variety of leaves grown on about 
0.66 acre of land 
Season Leaf yield Quantity of eggs 
(kg*.) Ni FL Bi 
April-May 3,200 700 425 355 
Aug.-Sept. 2,500 550 325 275 
Nov.-Dec. 3,200 650 375-400 300-325 
Feb.-March 3,200 650 375-400 300-325 
Total 12,100 2550 1500-1550 1230-1280 
Notes : (1) During Aug.-September the leaf yield declines. 
(2) During Feb.-March and, especially, Nov.-December 
the life-cycle of the silkworm becomes longer 
resulting in increased requirement of leaves. 
(3) Normally, 100 dfls. of Ni (Nistari) consume 
about .450 kg., Fj hybrid 750 kg., and pure 
bivoltine (Bi) 900 kg. of mulberry leaves. 
\ 
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Appendix I 
Cost of cultivation of one hectare of mulberry under 
irrigated conditions per annum in West Bengal 
rear of cultivation'1" : Rs, 
1. Preparation of land : 
Digging, levelling and manuring o 
150 man-days 2,700/-
Ploughing — 22 pairs of bullocks 
@ R?.25/- per day 550./-
2. Cost of mulberry cuttings-60 maunds 
@ Rs.lO/- per md. 600/-
Preparation of cuttings - 20 man-day 360/-
3. Planting - 75 man-days 1,350/-
* -1 ' ~ V & • . . 
4. Manures and fertilizers : 
a) Farmyard manure 10 tonnes @ Rs.lOO/- per ton 1,000/-
b) Fertilizer - 100 kg. N : 80 kg. P: 80 kg.K 2,500/-
5. Irrigation 500/-
Total : 
ft 
40 : 
Contd. 
2nd ^ear of cultivation : 
1. Fruning 4 times — 168 man-days 
2. Light digging 4 times - 336 man-days 
3. Weeding 4 times - 336 man-days 
4. Heavy digging once (January-February) 
- 105 man-days 
5. Manures and fertilizers : 
a) Farmyard manure - 22 tonnes @ Fs.lOO/- per ton 
b) Fertilizer - 336 kg. N: 80 kg. P:80 kg. K 
6. Irrigation (4 times a year) 
Total : 
yield : 44,500 kg. per hectare per annum' 
Production cost of 1 kg. of leaf = 56 paise 
Ps. 
3,024/. 
6,048/-
6,048/-
1,890/-
2,200/-
3,500A 
2,000/-
24,710/-
Leaf 
Source : The method of estimation of costs has been taken 
from S.R. Ullal'and M.N. Narasimhanna, Handbook of 
Practic_a 1 Sericulture, Central Silk Boa^T,"T5F7, 
pp.' X c P 
Notes : (1) In the year of planting, expenditure has to be 
incurred for preparation of land, building, 
planting, etc. This cost has to be divided 
over a period of 10 years as mulberry is a 
perennial crop and lasts easily for 10 years. 
Mulberry comes to bearing after about 6 months 
of planting. However, the output of mulberry' 
leaf in the first year of planting is rather 
low (Ullal and Narasimhanna, 1987). 
Contd. 
Contd. 
Man-day are valued at R?.18/~ per day, according to 
the minimum wages declared by the Government of 
West Bengal. 
In West Bengal, the R & D of the Central Silk Board 
suggests only 4 harvests due to seasonal conditions 
favouring silkworm rearing — in May-June (Jaistha), 
August - September (Bhaduri), October - November 
(Agrahaj^ani) , and January-February (Chaitra) . 
V 
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